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EDITORIAL NOTES
THE SCHOOL OF LAW opened its eightieth session this fall with a net registration of 111 students, of whom 65 are in the first year class, 40 in the second
year class, and 6 in the third year class. Of 111 enrolled, 99 have had some
preliminary college training. Twenty-five of these have had but one year, 37
have had two years, 24 have had three years, and 13 have received a college degree. Of the 111 now in the School, 37 have indicated a desire to pursue the
three year course leading to the degree of LL.B. Twenty of these are in the first
year class, 13 in the second year class, and 4 in the third year class.
At its August meeting, the executive committee of the board of trustees
created the Thomas Ruffin Lectureship in Law, and invited Hon. Henry G.
Connor, judge of the United States District Court for the eastern district of
North Carolina, to become its first incumbent. It is earnestly hoped by all
friends of the School that Judge Connor will find it possible to accept the appointment. From an experience of twenty-two years in the practice of the law,
of three terms in the legislature, of eight years as a judge of the Superior Court,
of six years as an associate justice of the Supreme Court of North Carolina, and
of thirteen years as a federal district judge, Judge Connor would bring to the
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work of the School a practical point of view, a breadth of knowledge of the
law, and a comprehension of its actual operation, of inestimable value.
Mr. Wilbur Stout, A. M., of Burlington, a graduate student in the Department of English, has been appointed secretary and librarian of the School of
Law, on a one half time basis. This has resulted in the library being entirely rearranged, catalogued, and repaired, and in the reorganization of the registration
and record work of the dean's office.
The library has been enlarged by the purchase during the summer of all of
the English law reports since 1876, of complete sets of the leading legal periodicals, and of a considerable number of the more important treatises.
Work has been started on the new law building. It will be ready for occupancy late in the spring. Construction difficulties necessitated certain changes
in the interior detail, but in general the plan remains the same as that described
in the June number of the REVIEW. The new home of the School is to be known
as Manning Hall, in honor of Dr. John Manning, who became the first professor
of law in the University in 1881.
Through an inadvertence, the note in the June number of the REVIEW on
The New Law Building failed to state that the School of Law was housed, for a
number of years during the 'nineties, in the Old West Building.

THE TEACHING OF STATUTE LAw-There will be a round table conference
on The Teaching of Statute Law and Legislation,' at the forthcoming meeting
of the Association of American Law Schools, to be held in Chicago on December
28, 29, and 30. The Statutes conference will be held on Saturday morning, December 30, at 9:30 A. M. It is expected that the conference will be attended not
only by law teachers, but by members of the American Political Science Association, and by representatives of official state and federal legislative bill-drafting
agencies. In this connection, Professor Ernst Freund, of the University of Chicago Law School, has prepared an outline of a basis for the discussion at this
conference. That outline, together with some comment, follows:
MEMORANDUM TO SERVE AS A BASIS FOR A ROUND TABLE DISCUSSION
OF A COURSE ON STATUTES.

A law school course in Statutes may mean one of the following five things:
(1) A course on the Contents of the Statute Book and Legislative History;
(2) a course on the Constructionand Operation of Statutes; (3) a course in State
Constitutional Law; (4) a course on Legislative Powers-and Methods; (5) a
course on Legislative Terms and Provisions.
(1) A course on the Contents of the Statute Book and Legislative History:
This would be both practically valuable and juristically instructive. The
difficulty is in the method of teaching. This would be almost inevitably through
lectures. To some extent the aid of students might be enlisted in collecting material, particularly data relating to the history of legislation, and while much of
'

In this whole connection, see W. F. Dodd, Statute Law and the Law School, I N. C. L. Rev. 1.
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this may be tedious and unprofitable, other phases, as e.g., a gathering of historical data from state reports (both judicial and administrative) might furnish
valuable contributions to the knowledge of state law. The course would be similar to the continental courses on Administrative Law, which are practically summaries of the statute law (other than private law and criminal law statutes) of
the state. I am inclined to think that those who talk of teaching Statutes
generally do not have such a course in mind.
(2) A course in Construction and Operation of Statutes:
A difference should be made between operation and construction: Operation, covering such matters as repealing effect, and particularly the civil consequences of violating statutes (liability, nullity of acts) is a subject of considerable practical value, and can be taught on the basis of cases. However, it is
but one of the many common law topics that might be added to the law school
curriculum, with no special claim to preeminence. Construction, i. e., rules and
principles of interpretation, is of the greatest practical importance. The many
law school courses dealing with statutory subjects cannot give adequate treatment to the problem as a special phase of jurisprudence. The difficulty is how to
teach the subject. The ordinary case method is unsuitable, since what is important is not judicial doctrine, but judicial practice. A discussion of the proper
method of teaching such a subject might be profitable.
(3) A course in State Constitutional Law: This course is as legitimate as a
course in federal constitutional law, and of much the same character: instead of
dealing with general constitutional principles, it deals with positive limitations
and requirements and is concerned mainly with the construction of clauses. It
incidentally serves to introduce the student to many fields of legislation with
which he otherwise remains unfamiliar. At option, it may be treated on a purely
local or on a national basis. A minor, but from the draftsman's 'point of view
indispensable, part of the subject would be the procedural and style requirements
regarding statutes. The course would be interesting, valuable and popular. But
it should also be recognized that it is not a new type of a course. It deals with
judicial decisions and uses the approved method of the study of cases. It does
not give the student a new side of the law.
(4) A course on Legislative Powers and Methods: This course may be conceived as follows: The teacher would take up a number of current or typical legislative problems, and would inquire for each how it should be legislatively
handled: locally, or by the state, or nationally; through civil. legislation, criminal
legislation, regulation, taxation, or appropriation of public resources. What
would be the advantages and disadvantages of each method? What would be the
structure of each type of statute? What would it involve in the way of administrative provisions? What perils would'have to be guarded against? And so
forth. This would be a new course in substance and in point of view; it would
get away from exclusively judicial doctrine and case law. It would be constructively and positively what constitutional law is analytically and negatively.
The drawback of the course is that there is little material available for it. Such
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material could, of course, be built up, particularly with advanced classes. The
danger is that with the usual training of law teachers, they would almost inevitably be drawn toward the constitutional problems which the course would present in considerable numbers, with which they are more familiar than with the
constructive side, and which they could handle on the basis of cases. In the
hands of most teachers the course would tend to become a course in
ConstitutionalLaw.
(5) A course on Legislative Terms and Provisions: This is the course that
I am giving at present. It is of more restricted scope than course (4) ; instead
of considering the economy of legislation in a large way, it deals with technique
and formulae. On the other hand, it is compact and complete. The Legislative
Drafting Report of the American Bar Association, of 1921, which serves as a
syllabus, gives a tolerably exhaustive outline of the drafting problems peculiar to
each type of statute, and irrespective of any particular subject matter. Material
for the course is, therefore, available in print. Both courses (4) and (5) deal with
statutes as something to be constructed and iiot simply to be construed, not as
the given thing but as the thing to be found. They approach law not from the
point of view of the court room, but from the point of view of the legislator
who is called upon to produce legal results before a controversy has arisen,-a
point of view that other law school courses present only in the most incidental
fashion. They are based on statutory precedents and require the study of statute
books.
In a round table discussion of the various types of courses, it should be
considered particularly whether a course conducted on another basis than case
law is desirable or practicable, also whether or not experience has shown that
it is difficult to mingle in the same course the critical and constructive attitude,
whether in other words it is possible to get the student away from his customary frame of mind, unless the point of view which forces the other mental attitude is made prominent, if not exclusive, in the course. If the difficulty exists,
there is little use in suggesting as a compromise that the matter of courses (4)
and (5) be handled incidentally to course (3).
It may be desirable to invite to the discussion teachers in graduate schools
of political science, since the American Political Science Association has its
meeting in Chicago at the same time. In that event, there should also be considered the more political phases of legislation, some of which might be of
considerable interest to law teachers.
Would it not ajso be well to ask representatives of drafting bureaus to join
the conference? We should certainly be advised what they consider as essential. Moreover, it may be that as a by-product of a course on Statutes, there
may be devised and formulated standard clauses which may dispose once for
all of some drafting problems. As to the practicability and value of such clauses
the opinion of drafting experts would be important.
ERNST FREUND.
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COMMENT ON MR. FREUNDS MEMORANDUM.

A comprehensive discussion of the teaching of Statute Law and Legislation
should be prefaced by the following considerations:
(1) What should be the function of such a course in the law school? Should
it be that of training professional legislative bill-drafters for the growing number of civic and governmental agencies devoted to the improvement of legislation? Or should the function of the course be that of contributing to the training of a bar that is coming more and more to deal with problems of statute
law ?2

(2) Is there not a possible distinction in this connection between the situation of a state university law school and that of a privately endowed national
institution? That is to say, is it not conceivable that a state school might be
expected to contribute something to the scientific development of the legal
phases of the processes of state government, in return for state support? And
with a definitely localized student body, could not a state school hope to direct
attention in a Statutes course mainly upon the conditions peculiar to the local
jurisdiction and thus integrate the course more positively with existing problems?
(3) In view of the present professional characteristics of law teachers, as
a class, and of the present nature of the training available for law teachers,
should not the type of law school course to be given, if any, be made to depend
somewhat upon the type of instructor available to teach the course? Most law
teachers are recruited from the bar, with its conventionalized training. Few
law teachers have had contact with constructive statute law making. As Mr.
Freund points out, there is a marked distinction between the various attitudes
and emphases that might be expected from instructors with these different backgrounds. After all, the content of a law school course depends largely upon the
training, experience, and attitude of the particular man in charge of the class.
(4) In view of the present overcrowded condition of the curriculum, a
course in Statutes would probably be listed in the law school catalogue as an
elective. While in the larger universities, a number of graduate students in
political science might be expected to elect such a course, most of the meni to
whom the appeal would be directed would be law students. And whatever might
be the aptitude of graduate students in political science for one or more of the
various types of courses suggested in Mr. Freund's outline, the precise course to
be given in the law school should be one that is adapted for a group of students
whose time is mainly occupied with the negatively analytical handling of substantive and adjective law topics conveniently arranged and set forth in casebooks. The suggestion in mind is that in the three essential considerations of
necessary preliminary preparation, materials for study, and instructional technique, the law school course in Statutes must inevitably be adjusted to what can
reasonably be expected of law students. What has just been said, however,
should not be confused with the matter of the attitude and emphasis of the
2

See Dodd. op. cit., pages 2.4.
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course. It is believed that the constructive legal engineering emphasis of a law
school course in Statutes constitutes its most valuable asset.
Coming now to Mr. Freund's memorandum of five possible law school
courses in Statutes, it will be noted that he has made no place for a course in
what might be termed Contemporary Legislative Policy.3 Nor does any part of
any of the courses mentioned purport to deal, as does Dean Wigmore's Job Analysis Method of Teaching the Use of Law Sources,4 with the problem of how to find
the statute law and its relation in a particular jurisdiction to the case law.
Moreover, the five courses listed are considered as separate possibilities. As he
indicates near the close of the memorandum, Mr. Freund doubts the advisability
of bringing various topics out of the five courses into a single course. It is
conceivable, however, that some such combination might be both practical and
consistent with the predominant constructive emphasis that is so much to be
desired.
Mr. Freund's conception of course (1) on the Contents of the Statutes
Book and Legislative History should be compared with Mr. W. F. Dodd's suggestion 5 that the contents of the statute book be taught by the study of a carefully selected series of statutes and cases illustrating the function of the statute
law in the legal system. In other words, Mr. Dodd's idea is that as a part of a
broader course in Statutes, typical problems might be investigated to get at the
relationship between the statute law and the case law, the extent to which
common law principles have been replaced by statutes, the attitude of courts in
the construction of statutes, and the. respective functions of judicial and
legislative law making.
The same suggestion might be made in connection with course (2) on the
Construction and Operation of Statutes. If only the more important problems
were gdne into, the case method of instruction could be used in dealing with
operation and construction as topics of a broader course. And judicial practice
could be studied as well as judicial doctrine. Judicial practice is distinguished
from judicial doctrine now in such case method courses as Constitutional Law
and Private Corporations,particularly in the topics of interstate commerce, due
process of law, and de facto corporations.
There should be room in the law school curriculum for course (3) on State
Constitutional Law. An undeveloped and important field, its investigation is
primarily the opportunity of the state university law schools. Dealing as it does
with the organization and powers of the state, county, and local government
units, and their operation in the fields of education, taxation, public W'velfare, etc.,
its subject matter vitally affects the civic interests of the state. No one who
has undertaken to trace the development of the constitutional law of a particular
state can deprecate either the intellectual gymnastics involved in such an exercise,
or the difficulties inherent in the conflict of judicial policies. While, of course,
3 Ibid., pages 4-5, and J. H. Wigmore. Recent Phases of Cdntemporary Legislative Proposals, 15 Ill. L.
Rev. 141.
4This course is described in an article under that title in 16 Ill. L. Rev. 499.
1 In Statute Law and the Law School, I N. C. L. Rev. 1.
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the use of cases in courses on State Constitutional Law would follow the conventional plan, the subject matter of the course would be a startling revelation to
the typical law student. And what might be termed the "vertical" case method
necessarily involved in tracing the development of the law of the student's home
jurisdiction would leave the student with a definite appreciation of the zig-zag
path that has been pursued in bringing any one doctrine in a given jurisdiction
up to its present status. From the standpoint of a course in Statutes, however,
the matter of state constitutional law should be treated not as the subject matter
of a separate course, but as a vital part of a broader course on Statutes as a
whole.6 The function of state constitutional law in connection with the legislature, and the peculiar substantive, procedural, and formal limitations it imposes
upon legislative power, are inseparably connected with the significance of statute
law in the legal system and with constructive problems of legal engineering
through statutes. For state constitutional law, in this connection, erects and
controls the machinery for state legislative action.
Courses (4) and (5) on Legislative Powers and Methods, and Legislative
Terms and Provisions, as conceived by Mr. Freund, furnish the constructive emphasis and focus of a course on Statutes. His views on the desirability of such
an emphasis deserve the widest sanction. Probably no other place in the curriculum can be found so convenient for the making of such an emphasis. With
his unique training, experience, and attitude toward statute law, Mr. Freund
could give either course successfully. His course in Statutes, after some ten
years of experiment, now takes the form of course (5). And it has been a
popular and valuable course. The writer's whole interest in statute law springs
from a stimulus originally received in that course in 1915. No criticism is di7
It is believed that
rected here against the content of courses (4) and (5).
could be efcourse
under the proper conditions, the subject matter of either
suggesFreund's
fectively taught. But there are two possible criticisms of Mr.
tion that either course should constitute the entire content of a law school course
in Statutes. In the first place, there are probably few men now in the teaching
profession who could properly handle such a course. More men of this type
should, however, be developed. In the second place, there is nothing in the law
school curriculum to prepare the student for dealing so abruptly and intensively
with the problems involved in courses (4) and (5). The average law student
does not have the background against which such a course must be placed if it
is to be fully comprehended. He should be led up to the problems involved in
eIbid., page 6.
7 Mr. Dodd's criticism of course (5), op. cit., page 4, is probably based largely upon the fact that the
1921 Report of the American Bar Association's Special Committee on Legislative Drafting was prepared
as a manual for professional legislative draftsmen actually engaged in drafting work, with a N-ew of
furnishing these trained and experienced men with detailed precedents and suggestions for terms and
formulae to meet constantly recurring drafting problems, rather than as a basis for instructing novices in
their first approach to the whole significance of statute law-making. In other words, his objection is that
Mr. Freund's course (5) means little or nothing in the training of a student unless the student has first
something on which to hitch the material. A course on Legislative Terms and Provisions, in Mr. Dodd's opinion, is not a good training for a draftsman and means little or nothing unless it has as a preliminary basis
some notion of how the process of enacting statutes fits into our legal and ggvernmental situation. Just
at this point reference should be made to Mr. Dodd's view, op. cit. page 4, that an accurate and comprehensive knowledge of the local technique of legislation and policy of governmental function is vital to
the success of a draftsman's work.
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these two courses through a study of the significance of statutes in our legal
system and of the constitutional machinery used in the making of statute law.
This would, of course, leave much less time available for the subject matter of
courses (4) and (5). If the function of the law school course in Statutes is
conceived to be that of training professional legislative bill-drafters, this would
be a serious defect, for both courses (4) and (5) contain excellent and thoroughgoing training for draftsmen. On the other hand, if the function of the course
should be thought of as that of contributing to the training of a bar that increasingly deals with statutory problems, then the defect would be less important, provided sufficient attention were given to the subject matter of courses
(4) and (5) to impress the student with the type of problems involved and the
general technique of their solution, and to furnish a strong constructive focus
and emphasis as the climax of the course.
In general, the purpose of this comment upon Mr. Freund's memorandum
has been that of directing attention to the issues raised by a comparison between
Mr. Freund's views and those presented by Mr. Dodd in the June number of
this REVIEW. The problem is important and difficult, and consists mainly of the
question as to what, in view of the various conceptions of the purpose of
a law course in Statutes, can be selected from the wide range of topics of statute
law, and effectively taught to law students by professional law teachers.
M. T. V. H.
SHELLEY'S CASE AND LIMITATIONS OVER AFTER ESTATES TAIL IN NORTH
disposition of property of' frequent occurrence, especially in wills,
is (a) a life estate to A, who is usually a near relative, say son or daughter of
the testator, settler, or grantor, followed by (b) an estate tail to the heirs of A's
body, with (c) on failure of such heirs of the body or issue or the like, a limitation over in fee simple to the heirs general of A.
The courts of North Carolina have usually, in considering the application of
the Rule in Shelley's Case to such a series of limitations, considered the whole
series as one limitation, just as would have been done at common law, and
have thus determined the application or non-application of the Rule. The writer
suggests that under our statutes, a.simpler method would be to consider the limitations separately. The result as shown by the decisions would be in almost every
case the same, but the reasoning would be much simpler, and being founded on
the interpretation of our own statutes, would, if the suggestion is correct, be
more satisfactory.
The Rule presupposes a freehold (in this state a life estate) in the ancestor1
CAROLINA-A

IAt
common law, as well as under that expression: the statute de donis, there were two freeholds
which the ancestor might take under the limitation within the Rule, an estate for life and an estate tail.
But in North Carolina since the statute of 1784. C. S. sec. 1734. there is left only a life estate which the'
ancestor may take under the limitations and which satisfies the conditions for the Rule. We might with
a gain in simplicity and exactness embody this statutory result in our statement of the Rule. so as to
make it, if Coke's language is adopted, read: "When by any gift or conveyance the ancestor takes a life
estate," etc. or if Preston and Kent's statement is preferred. it could read: "When a person takes a ife
estote legally or equitably . . . ." etc. See the statements of -the Rule in the words of Coke and Kent,
who follows Preston, in Smith v. Proctor, 139 N. C. 314. 51 S. E. 889. 2 L. R. A. (n. s.) 172 (1905).
"Life estates" include, of course, estates per autre vie and life estates subject to special limitations,
as estates durante zdduitate. 1 Tiffany, Real Property, 1920 ed. 534; Challis, Real Property. 3rd ed. 162;
Ham v. Ham. 21 N. C. 598 (1837). (bequest of slaves to heirs general after estate for widowhood).
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and a remainder in the heir. 2 Consequently, in the series of limitations under
consideration, if the limitation over, limitation (c) in the illustration above, is an
executory limitation and not a remainder, the Rule is inapplicable to the limitation over.
The statute of 1784, C. S. sec. 1734, changed an estate tail to a fee simple in
the first taker under the entail. The Rule by its very terms unites the life estate,
(a) above, with the remainder in tail, (b) above, into a fee tail in the ancestor,
which the statute of 1784 thereupon converts to a fee simple. The limitation
over, (c) above, can no longer be a remainder after a fee tail, as at common
law, upon which the Rule could operate, but becomes instantly a limitation over
after a fee simple, that is, an executory limitation, which is not within the
operation of the Rule.
This construction of the limitation over is the same as that given at common law to be a limitation over after an estate tail in chattels, or more accurately
after a limitation which, if the subject matter were real property, would be an
estate tail,3 and was adopted to preserve the limitation over so far as possible.
That limitation must fail as a remainder, and even as an executory devise could
not be effective, under the rule against perpetuities, if the failure of issue on
which it was to vest was an "indefinite failure. ' "3 Consequently, to save it, the
courts were astute to seize any phrase which would make the failure definite
rather than indefinite. 4 To such an extent was this method of construction carried that in a will including both real and personal property, the same phrase describing failure was held to make an indefinite failure as to realty and a definite
failure as to personalty, 5 while various expressions which, applied to realty
were held to make an indefinite failure, and so to give a remainder after an estate tail, were held when applied to personalty, to make a definite failure and so
not to invalidate the executory limitation over for remoteness. 6
Under the statute of 1784, all limitations in real as well as personal property
after what would at common law have been an estate tail, become limitations
after a fee simple and therefore dependent for their validity on whether the contingency creates a definite rather than an indefinite failure., Applying to such
2This is embodied in every statement of the Rule. "The Rule does not apply when the subsequent
limitation is an executory limitation." Challis, Real Property, 3rd ed. 165.
sWords conferring an estate in tail in real, give an absolute interest in personal property. Leventhope
v. Ashbie, Rolle's Abr. 831 p1. 1, Tudor's Leading Cases, Real Property, 4th ed. 382 and note (1635);
Nichols v. Cartwright, 6 N. C. 137 (1812); Davidson v. Davidson, 8 N. C. 162 (1820); Floyd v. Thonpson, 20 N. C. 478 (1839); Swain v. Rascoe, 25 N. C. 200 (1842); Coon v. Rice, 29 N. C. 217 (1847).
sa Cutlar v. Cutlar, 3 N. C. 154 (1801), (bequest of slaves over after life estate void); Williams v.
Holly, 4 N. C. 266 (1815), (limitation after fee in land void); Folk v. Whitley, 30 N. C. 133 (1847),
(limitation over after fee in land void). 1
4 Davidson v. Davidson, 8 N. C. 162 (1820); Ward v. Jones, 40 N. C. 400 (1848). In cases involving
personal property, so strong a demonstration of intention to exclude a general failure is not required as
in cases of real property. Allen v. Pass, 20 N. C. 207 (1838).
'Forth v. Chapman, 1 P. Wm. 663, Tudor's Leading Cases, Real Property, 4th ed., 371 (1720).
0 4 Kent, Commentaries, 282 and note (a);'1 Tiffany, Real Property, 1920 ed. 66 and note. Words of
distribution superadded to "heirs of body," give the first taker only a life estate in bequests of slaves.
Allen v. Pass, 20 N. C. 207 (1838); Swain v. Rascoe, 25 N. C. 200, 38 Am. D. 720 (1842). overruling
Bradley v. Jones, 37 N. C. 245 (1842).
rSnith v. Brisson, 90 N. C. 284 (1884); Sessoms v. Sessoms, 144 N. C. 121, 56 S. E. 687 (1907);
Patterson v. McCormick, 177 N. C. 448. 99 S. E. 401 (1919). In Ward v. Jones, 40'N. C. 400 (1848),
which involved the construction of a will made in 1788, Pearson, 3., in an admirable opinion throws a
flood of light on the whole subject. He adverts to the difference which had grown up in England between
the interpretation of devises of realty and bequests of personalty; shows that the attitude of the courts
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limitations the rules developed at common law, our courts were compelled to

hold many devises void for remoteness.8 And the various devices held applicable to bequests over were adopted with regard to devises over after an estate tail.9
But in 1827 the legislature relieved the situation by an act, now C. S. sec.
1737, which provided that all limitations after failure of issue or heirs or the
like, should, in the absence of a clearly expressed contrary intention, be interpreted as meaning a failure at the death of the first taker, thus bringing all
such limitations within 10 the period allowed by the rule against perpetuities, and
The statute of 1827 by saving
making them valid as executory limitations."
remoteness
and by validating them as
all limitations over from the objection of
of the cases arising
connection
to
obscure
the
executory limitations has tended
come
up as questions of
under it with the Rule. Questions of remoteness now
statutory construction, to be decided on the principle of lex ita scripta est, and
the principle that such limitations are validated as executory devises and not as
toward limitations after bequests of personal property grew out of the effort to preserve the limitations
over from failing through remoteness: that the statute of 1784, by making limitations after estates tall
executory, produces the same problem in limitations after devises in fee tail, as confronted courts before
the statute as to bequests; and consequently that the rules for the construction of such bequests now
goerN such devises-the same principles as to expressions which save from remoteness, whether expres.
sions of distribution or expressions which render a failure of issue over definite and not indefinite, As
the will long antedated the statute of 1827, the opinion and ruling are entirely independent of that statute.
$Davidson v. Davidson, 8 N. C. 162 (1820). (gift of land and chattels after implied elitate tail, under
statute 1784, both void for remoteness); Sanders v. Hyatt, 8 N. C. 246 (1821), (devise under the same
conoition void); Hollohand v. Kornegay; 29 N. C. 261 (1847), (same). Folk v. Whitley, 30 N. C. 1.3
(1847), (same).
9Expressions of distribution such as "share and share alike," "equally to be divided," etc., superadded tc a gift in tail of land in a limitation, were held to show a definite failure and prevent the aotpli.
cation of the Rule, as had long been established in cases of personal property. Moore v. Parker, 34 N. C.
123 (1851); Ward v. Jones, 40 N. C. 400 (1848). This was contrary to the English rule laid down in
See
Jesson v. Wright, 2 Bligh 1 (1820) which had been followed in Ross v. Toms, 15 N. C. 376 (1833).
Mills v. Thorne, 95 N. C. 362 (1886).
An internediate period between the death of the testator and the ultimate failure of issue, such as
arrival at full age, was seized on to save the limitation over. Patterson v. McCormick, 177 N. C. 448, 99
S. E. 40 (1919), explaining Hilliard v. Kearney, 45 N. C. 221 (1853).
10The act of 1827 has been the subject of much discussion in the courts and an admirable examination
and exposition of the cases under it by Clark, C. J., is contained in Patterson v. McCor,nick, 177 N. C,
I
448, 99 S. E. 40 (1919). This should put the construction of the statute at rest.
1 S,nith v. Brisson, 90 N. C. 284 (1884), (overruling Ex parte McBee, 63 N. C. 332 (1869); Patterson
The doctrine of alternative contingent remainders
v. McCormick, 177 N. C. 448. 99 S. E. 40 (1919).
founded on "a contingency in a double aspect," Loddington v. Kime, T.d. Raym. 203, 1 Salk 224 15 E,
R. C. 729 (1694); or of limitations which in one event are contingent remainders and in anotter are
executory devises, Doe d. Herbert v. Shelby, 2 B. & Cr. 926 (1824), 1 Tiffany, Real Property 1920 ed, 581,
cannot apply, for by the statute of 1784 the limitation to the first takers, heirs in tail, becomes a fee
simple at the moment of the creation of the life estate in such first taker, and the remainder over at that
instant, i. e., the creation of the limitation, becomes executory.
An excellent statement of the effect of alternative limitations upon such a series of limitations as we
are considering, from the standpoint of common law, that is, exclusive of such a statute as C. S. see,
1734, is contained in Leake's Property in Land, 2nd ed., 263-264.
In Jarvis v. Wyatt. 11 N. C. 227 (1825), Henderson, J.. Hall, J. concurring, thought the act of 1784
gave the life tenant a fee simple, and not an estate tail converted into a fee simple. Judge Henderson's
views as to the application of common law principles are almost unerring, but tlid he not for the moment
lose sight of the fact that as the limitation stood there was nothing for the statute to operate upon? The
life estate in the ancestor and the fee tail in remainder had first to be seized upon by the Rule and con.
verted into a fee tail in possession of the ancestor, before there were the conditions required for the
operation of the statute. At any rate this is the well established doctrine now. Chambers v. Payne, 59 N.
C. 276 (1862); Nichols v. Gladden 117 N. C. 497, 23 S. E. 459 J1895).
In Watson v. Smith: 110 N. L 6, 14 S. E. 640 (1892), the doctrine of alternative remainders, follow.
ing a suggestion in Watson v. Dodd, 68 N. C. 528 (1873), of Pearson, C. J., (who curiously enough wrote
the opinion in Ward v. Jones, alluded to above), is adopted and applied to a limitation over, "if the life
tenant dies without heirs living at his death." Of course there was and could be no uestion of the ap,
plication of the Rule, but the question of the nature of the limitation over wotld seem the same. The
court admitted that the question was not before it.
In Smith v. Brisson, 90 N. C. 284 (1884), land was limited by deed to A. and the heirs or his body,
but if he dies without such heirs living at the time of his death, then over. Although the deed was
within the statute of 1827 and therefore the failure was definite, and although A. never had heirs of his
body, yet the statute of 1784 operated to change the estate tail to a fee simple and the limitation over was
executory. See also the limitation in Spruill v. Leory, 35 N. C. 225. 408 (1851), all the judges holding
the limitation over to be executory. But so far as the application of the Rule is concerned, the question is
immaterial. If the first limitation is. because of the expressions used in its creation, not a remainder,
cadit quaestio;, if the limitation is a fee tail, then on principle and authority the second limitation Is
executory.
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remainders is rarely necessarily considered. Thus the statute has split what
was formerly of necessity a single line of decisions into two lines. One line
deals with the application of the statute of 1827,12 and the other considers the
Rule as applied to such limitations.
In almost all the cases, the limitation over has been held to take the case out
of the Rule on some common law principle applicable to the particular wording
employed in the case.' 3 The reasoning in very many of these cases would
have been much simplified if the theory of this note had been used. In a few
cases, however, it has been held, again on common law principles, that the Rule
is applicable to such limitations over. It is submitted that these last cases were
incorrectly decided. The very consideration of the application of the Rule
involves the assumption that the limitation over is a remainder, whereas under
our statutes and decisions it is an executory limitation, to which it is impossible
14
that the Rule should apply.
L. P. McG.
CAsEs-The hearsay evidence rule was devised by the common law judges to exclude from the consideration of the jury,
testimony based upon statements made to the witness outside of court, not unDYING DECLARATIONS IN

CIVIL

" See eases at beginning of note 11.
13Since 1869, the cases holding the Rule inapplicable where there is a limitation over are as follows:
Patrick v. Morehead, 85 N. C. 62 (1881); Smith v. Brisson, 90 N. C. 284 (1884), (overruling Ex parte
McBee, 63 N. C. 332 (1869); Graves v. Trueblood, 96 N. C. 495 (1887); Howell v. Knight, 100 N. C.
254, 6 S. E. 721 (1888); Francks v. Whitaker, 116 N. C. 518, 21 S. E. 175 (1895); Bird v. Gilliam, 121
N. C. 326, 28 S. E. 489 (1897); May v. Lewis, 132 N. C. 115, 43 S. E. 550 (1903); Houser v. Crafts,
134 N. C. 319, 46 S. E. 756 (1904); Williamson v. Boyd, 136 N. C. 46, 48 S. E. 516 (1904); Thompson
v. Crusnp, 138 N. C. 32, 50 S. E. 457 (1905)1 Smith v. Proctor, 139 N. C. 314, 51 S. E. 889. 2 L. R. A.
(n. s.)172 (1905); Faison v. Odom, 144 N. C. 107, 56 S. E. 793 (1907); Cox v. Jernigan, 154 N. C. 584,
70 S. E. 949 (1911); Pucket v. Morgan, 158 N. C. 344, 74 S. E. 15 (1912); Jones v. Whichard, 163 N.
C. 241, 79 S. E. 503 (1913); Millcr v. Harding, 167 N. C. 53, 83 S. E. 725 (1914); Shuford v. Brady, 169
N. C. 224, 85 S. E. 303 (1915); Williams v. Blizzard, 176 N. C. 146, 96 S. E. 957 (1918); Pugh v. Allen,
179 N. C. 307, 102 S. E. 394 (1920); Blackledge v. Simmons. 180 N. C. 535, 105 S. E. 202 (1920); Wallace v. Wallace, 181 N. C. 158, 106 S. E. 501 (1921); Reid v. Neil, 182 N. C. 192. 108 S. E. 769 (1921);
Hampton v. Griggs, - N. C. -, 113 S. E. 501 (1922).
In Morrisette v. Stevens, 136 N. C. 160, 48 S. E. 661 (1904), and Whitfield v. Garris, 134 N. C. 24,
45 S. E. 904 (1903). reaffirming on rehearing Whitfield v. Garris, 131 N. C. 148. 45 S. E. 904 (1902),
under such limitations thelife tenant had heirs of his body and afterwards died, and it was correctly held
that he had a fee tail under the act of 1784 subject to executory limitations over in the event of his leaving no issue, and that his estate became absolute on his death, leaving children. In Sessoms v. Sessoms,
144 N. C. 121, 56 S. E. 687 (1907), the statement of facts appears to be incomplete. It seems a similar
case: if the first taker died without heirs of body it is believed he could have no absolute estate. See the
following note.
11Tyson v. Sinclair, 138 N. C. 23, 3 Ann. Cas. 397, 50 S. E. 450 (1905). Here the limitations were
to grandson for life, then to the lawful heir of his body in fee simple, but on failure of such issue then to
his right heirs in fee. It was held that under the Rule, the grandson took an estate in fee simple. It
would seem that the Rule would unite the life estate and the remainder in tail. which the statute of 1784
would convert into a fee simple subject to an executory devise over in case the grandson died without issue.
Consequently the grandson could not during his life have a fee simple absolute.
Wool v. Fleetwood, 136 N. C. 460, 48 S. E. 785. 67 L. R. A. 444 (1904), was a devise of a life estate
to children, L & E, at their death to their lawful heirs, and if they have no surviving heirs, then to my
(testator's) right heirs. Held that the Rule applied and L. & E. took a fee simple. It is submitted that
the phrase "if they have no surviving heirs" should have been read "if they have, or leave, no surviving
heirs of their bodies." Such a course was adopted in Dazidson v. Davidson, 8 N. C. 16 (1820); Smith v.
Brisson. 90 N. C. 284, and Rollins v. Keel, 115 N. C. 68, 20 S. E. 209 (1894), to effectuate the intention
of the testator. The statute of 1784 would then have applied, and the limitation over would have been
executory.
Radford v. Rose, 178 N. C. 288, 100 S. E. 249 (1919), was a devise interpreted in effect as follows:
To my daughter for life, and then to her bodily heirs to vest in possession on their attaining the age of
twenty-one; but if she have no bodily heirs, then the property to go back to the Rose family. Held, following Tyson v. Sinclair. supra, that under the Rule the daughter took an estate in fee. The court distin.
guishes the ease from Puckett v. Morgan, 158 N. C. 344. 74 S. E. 15 (1912), and Jones v. Whichard, 163
N. C. 241. 79 S. E. 503 (1913), on the ground that in those eases the devises over were to a different stock
of descent. It is submitted that the daughter under the devise over held not a fee simple absolute, but a
fee subject to an executory devise and during her life could give no perfect deed.
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der oath, and not subject to cross examination. The feeling back of the rule was
that statements uttered without these safeguards were unreliable.'
It was early recognized, however, that under given conditions, certain checks
other than the oath and cross examination might operate substantially as well to
guarantee the impartiality at least of extra-forum statements forming the basis
of testimony. Thus, especially when various considerations of history or of
social policy required it, the hearsay evidence rule became subject to a number
of exceptions and qualifications. And one of these permitted the introduction in
2
evidence of reports of dying declarations.
Today, the conditions incident to the admission of dying declarations are
well established. 3 They can be used only in prosecutions for the specific crime
of homicide, 4 not merely for an act actually resulting in death, but for an offence involving the resulting death of the declarant as an essential element. The
declaration must have been uttered while its maker was conscious of the fact
that he was about to die. It must deal with the cause of the killing and with the
circumstances immediately connected with the act. And the declarant must
actually have died prior to the trial.
The history of the development of the first of these conditions, however, is
a matter upon which law writers do not agree. On the one hand,5 it has been
urged that the original governing principle was simply that the witness being
dead, there was a necessity for taking his only available trustworthy statements,
namely, his dying declarations. These were deemed reliable because of a presumption that a God-fearing person who Was conscious of the actual approach of
death would be apt to tell the truth. This principle, if valid, was broad enough,
of course, to warrant the use of dying declarations in all cases, civil as well as
criminal. And the proponents of this principle insist that such was the established practice prior to the early 1800's. They explain the development of the
modern practice of lifhiting the use of dying declarations to homicide cases, by
the assertion that what was intended, in a treatise published in 1803,0 as a statement of the convenience of the use of dying declarations in certain murder cases,
was misconstrued by later courts and law writers as an authoritative indication
7
that the use of dying declarations was restricted and confined to such cases.
"Preston v. Bynum, 137 N. C. 491, 49 S. E. 955 (1905); 1 Greenleaf, Evidence, 16th ed., sec. 98, and
following; 2 Wigmore, Evidence,

sec.

1360, and following; Lockhart, Handbook of Evidence

for North

Carolina,
sec. 138.
2
1n general, see 1 Greenleaf, sec. 156; 2 Wigmore, sec. 1430; Lockhart, sec. 145.
'Barficld v. Britt, 47 N. C. 41 (1854); State v. Mills, 91 N. C. 582 (1884); State v. Laughter, 159
N. C. 488, 74 S. E. 913 (1912); and authorities cited in note 2, supra.
4The admission of dying declarations in such cases does not contravene the provision of the Bill of
Rights, N. C. Const.. art. 1 sec. 2. that "In all criminal prosecutions every man has the right . . . . to
confront the accusers and witnesses, etc." State v. Tilghman, 33 N. C. 513 (1850); 2 Wigmore, sec. 1398,

note 6; 1 Greenleaf, sec. 163 f, note 5. This is because the
adoption of the constitution cannot be said to have been
Rather, the practice is cognizable under the constitution, as
of those mentioned in notes 16 and 17, post, extending
constitutional?

established practice in vogue at the time of the
abrogated by so broad a declaration of rights.
an exception. Quacre, is a statute such as one
the practice to other types of criminal cases,

5See 1 Greenleaf, sec. 156a; 2 Wigmore, sec. 1431; McFarland v. Shaw, 4 N. C. 200 (181S), over.
ruled in Barfield v. Britt, 47 X. C. 41 (1854); Thurston v. Fritz, 91 Kas. 468, 138 Pac. 625 (1914).
1 East, Pleas of the Crown, 353.
See 1 Greenleaf, Evidence, Redfield's ed. of 1860, sec. 156, note, and Barfield v. Britt, 47 N. C. 41
(1854).
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The other view8 is that before the necessity arose for rationalizing the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule and the rule itself, dying declarations were
admitted as a matter of course, but mainly in homicide cases, that the instances of
their admission in civil cases were only occasional and sporadic, and that in some
of the civil cases the dying declarations were admitted not so much because the
declarant was in extremis as because the statements were actually declarations
against interest or statements forming part of the res gestae, within what were
later to be classed as other exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule. 9 In other
words, this view is that the principle controlling the admission of dying declarations is more properly that of the public necessity of using such evidence in
order to prevent manslayers from going free in cases where there are no other
eyewitnesses of the attack. It never has been indispensable, however, that there
should be no other witnesses available. The principle is based upon a presumption that in the majority of cases there will be no other satisfactory evidence of
the facts concerning the killing. 10
Regardless of this conflict of views as to the history of the governing principle, it is clear that prior to the early 1800's there were relatively few instances
of the use of dying declarations as evidence in civil cases,"1 and that since that
time there has been an almost unanimous practice, both in England and in the
United States, of confining their use to prosecutions for homicide. In large
measure, no doubt, this has been due to the obviously unsatisfactory character
of such evidence, and to the lack of opportunity afforded the party most directly
affected by the declaration for checking its accuracy by cross examination.
On the other hand, the confinement of the use of dying declarations to
homicide cases has sometimes been thought to be both unnecessary and unwise,
and a few courts have sought to disregard this restriction. Notable instances
12
of this are observable in the early North Carolina case of McFarland v. ShaW,'
decided in 1815, where the dying declaration of the victim was admitted in an
action of seduction brought by her father, and in the relatively recent Kansas
.case of Thurston v. Fritz, 13 decided in 1914, where, in an action for the balance
due upon a purchase of land, the court admitted the dying declaration of the
vendor concerning the circumstances surrounding the transaction. McFarland
v. Shaw, however, was expressly overruled in 1854, in Barfield v. Britt,1 4 and
the Kansas case has been severely criticised,' 5 both upon the ground that it flew
8 See 27 Harv. L. Rev. 739, and Wooten v. Wilkins, note 12, post.
( Dying declarations are still competent under these two exceptions.
See Barfield v. Britt, 47 N. C.
41 (1854); 1 Greenleaf, sec. 156a.
15 See authorities cited in notes 2 and 3, supra, and Commonwealth v. Roddy, 184 Pa. 274, 39 Atd.
211 (1908). The version sometimes given, that the accused should not Profit by his own wrong in putting
the principal witness out of the way, assumes, of course, the truth of the issue being tried, the defendant's
guilt of the killing.
11The cases are collected in 1 Greenleaf, sec. 156a. note 1; 2 Wigmore, sec. 1431, note 1, and 27
Harv. L. Rev. 739. See also 56 L. R. A. 360, note.
24 N. C. 200 (1815). See Wooten v. Wiikins, 39 Ga. 223. 99 Am. Dec. 456 (1869); Jackson v.
Vredenburgh, 1 Johns. (N. Y.) 159, 163 (1806).
V 91 Kas. 468, 138 Pac. 625, 50 L. R. A. (n. s.) 1164 (1914).
- 47 N. C. 41 (1854).
"See 27 Harv. L. R. 739, 14 Col. L. R. 520. and Humble, Departure from Precedent, 19 Mich. L.
R. 608.
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in the face of local decisions and statutory policies to the contrary, and upon
the further ground that so radical a change in the rules of evidence is more
properly a matter for legislative determination.
Legislatures have occasionally authorized the admission of dying declarations in prosecutions for abortion,' 0 in bastardy cases, "1 and more recently in
civil actions for wrongful death. Thus the amendment' 8 of 1919 to the North
Carolina statute providing for the recovery of damages for death caused by
wrongful act, neglect or default, 1 is of particular interest. This amendment is
as follows: "In all actions brought under this section, the dying declaration of
deceased as to the cause of his death shall be admissible in evidence in like
manner and under the same rules as dying declarations of deceased in criminal
actions for homicide are now received in evidence."
This provision came before the Supreme Court of North Carolina in the
21
two recent cases of Tatham v. Andrews Mfg. Co., 20 and Williams v. Railroad.
In both cases declarations made two years prior to the enactment of the amendment were admitted in evidence in actions brought after its passage. The court
held in each instance that the statute was constitutionally applicable to such
situations. 2 2 In the Tatham case, it was also "contended for defendant that
such declaration should not be allowed to avail the plaintiffs unless they carry
conviction beyond a reasonable doubt." The court promptly replied, however,
that the weight to be given to the dying declaration by the jury bore no relation
to its competency, and suggested that the same weight is to be given by the jury
to a dying declaration in an action for wrongful death as is given to other types
of evidence in similar cases. 23 In other words, the court's conception of the
significance of the statute in this connection is simply that it applies to the admissibility and consideration of dying declarations in this type of civil cases the
same tests that are applicable in cases of prosecutions for homicide, and no more.
D. G. D.
M. T. V. H.
THE ENFORCEMENT OF SUSPENDED SENTENCES-Some courts hold that in
the absence of an enabling statute, a criminal court is without power to suspend
sentence, after conviction or plea of guilty, for probationary purposes.' Other
courts regard such a statute as violative of the governor's constitutional pardon-

"iMass.

Stat. 1889, ch. 100: N. Y. Stat. 1875, ch. 352; Pa. Stat. 1895, June 26. P. L. 387. sec. 1.

15 Del. Rev. Stat., 1893, ch. 77, sec. 15; Miss. Ann. Code., 1892, sec. 257.

IsP. L., 1919, ch. 29."
C. S. sec. 160.
o 180 N. C. 627, 105 S. E. 423 (1920).
182 N. C. 267, 108 S. E. 915 (1921).
2 The constitutional prohibition of ex post facto laws doc
not apply to changes in the rules of cvi.
dence. Tabor v. Ward 83 N. C. 291. 294 (1880). Nor does one have a vested right in a rule of evidence.
State v. Barrett, 138 N. C. 630, 50 S. E. 506, 1 L. R. A. (n. s.) 626 (1905); 1 Wigmore, sec. 7.
0 As to impeaching or discrediting dying declarations, see Lockhart, sec. 145, and 16 A. L. R. 411,
note.

1 Gray v. State, 107 Ind. 177,
Hun. (N. Y.) 550, 21 N. Y. Suov.
note (1911); In re Webb. 89 Wis.
ing sentences in various situations,

8 N. E. 16 (1886); People v. Court of Sessions of Monroe County, 6
659; State v. Abbot, 87 S. C. 466, 70 S. E. 6, 33 L. R. A (n. s.) 112,
354, 62 N. W. 177 (1895).
For the common law practice of suspendsee 4 Blackstone, Commentaries, 394; I Chitty, Crim. Law, 757.
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ing power. 2 Most courts agree, however, that the power to withhold execution
of sentence during compliance with various conditions is inherent in criminal
4
courts of general jurisdiction.3 This is the view in North Carolina.
Normally, the suspension of a particular sentence is a matter resting in the
sound discretion of the trial judge.5 Similarly, whether there has in fact been
a subsequent breach of any condition of the suspension, and whether sentence
should be imposed and enforced, are properly questions for the original trial
judge to decide, without the intervention of a jury.6 But if the probationer has
already been adjudged not guilty of the offence alleged as a breach of a condition, by a court of competent jurisdiction, that judgment is conclusive of the
7
matter.
An essential condition of the suspension of a sentence is the consent of the
prisoner. 8 He may, if he wishes, take his punishment, instead. If payment of
the costs is required as one condition, compliance is not regarded as part of the
punishment so as to make the later enforcement of the sentence an additional
penalty.0 On the other hand, if sentence is suspended mainly upon condition
that sbecific acts be performed, such as the restitution of stolen goods or the
abatement of a nuisance, which might have constituted a part of a sentence, performance of these acts strips the court of further power in the premises.' 0 The
more common type of condition, however, is that the defendant maintain future
good behavior. Whether the time during which good behavior can be required
must be fixed and limited to the duration of the appropriate punishment, or
whether such conduct can be required to continue indefinitely, is a matter upon
which the courts do not agree. The better view is the one first suggested.'1 The
North Carolina court has held, however, that sentence may be suspended indefinitely, so as to permit the trial judge later to enforce the sentence for an
act of misbehavior occurring after the expiration of the originally available
12
period of imprisonment.
'People v. Brown, 54 Mich. 15, 19 N. V. 571 (1884); Spenser v. State, 125 Tenn. 64, 140 S. W. 597
(1911); People v. Blackburn, 6 Utah 347, 23 Pac. 759 (1890).
s Webber v. State, 58 Ohio St. 616, 51 N. E. 116. 41 L. R. A. 472 (1898); Commonuwcalth v. Dunleavv, 16 Pa. Sup. Ct. 380; Sh'estet' v. State, 65 N. H. 193, 20 Atl. 954, 33 L. R. A. (n. s.) 112, note
(1899).
'State v. Crook, 115 N. C. 760, 20 S. E. 513 (1894); State Y. Hardin, 183 N. C. 815, 112 S. E. 593
(1922).
5State v. Everitt, 164 N. C. 399, 79 S. E. 274 (1913); Commonwealth v. Doudiean's Bail, 115 Mass.
133 (1874). Under a statute authorizing the jury in rendering its verdict to provide for a suspended sentence. the courts of Texas require such a verdict as a condition precedent to the power of the court to
suspend a sentence. Johnson v. State, 169 S. W. (Tex. Cr. App.) 1151 (1914).
"State v. Greer, 173 N. C. 759, 92 S. E. 147 (1917); Sylvester v. State, supra, note 3; State v.
Hardin, supra, note 4.
1 State v. Hardin, supra, note 4.
8 Commonwealth v. Dozrdican's Bail, supra, note 5; State v. Hardin, s upra, note 4. In the normal
case, consent will be presumed. State v. E'eritt, supra, note 5.
'State v. Crook, supra, note 4. See also, State v. Miller, 6 Baxter (Tenn.) 513 (1873); and People
v. Felix, 45 Cal. 163 (1872).
"State v. Addy, 43 N. J. L. 113. 39 Am. Re . 547 (1881); Ex porte Lange, 18 Wall. (U. S.) 163, 21
L. Ed. 872 (1874)." State v. Gray, 8 Vroom. (N. J.) 368 (1875).
"That good behavior must be for a definitely fixed duration: U. S. v. Wilson, 46 Fed. 748 (1891);
People v. Barrett, 202 Ill. 287, 67 N. E. 23, 63 L. R. A. 82 and note (1903); Grundel v. People, 33 Col.
191 79 Pac. 1022 (1905) Neal v. State, 104 Ga. 509, 30 S. E. 858 (1899). See in this connection, 1 N.
C. L. Rev. 46.
12In re Hinson, 156 N. C. 251, 72 S. E. 310 .(1911). Compare Scott v. Chichester, 107 Va. 933, 60 S.
E. 95 (1908). and Neal v. State, supra, note 11. See also 33 L. R. A. (n. s.) 112, 16 L. R. A. (n. s.)
304, notes.
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What is contemplated by the term "good behavior"? Clearly, no moral or
ethical precepts are involved. It means conduct that does not violate law. But
this does not imply that a suspended sentence may be enforced for a breach of
contract or for a tort. Rather, the order of suspension, since it is for probationary purposes, contemplates only conformity with the criminal law. Moreover, a
petty offense, entirely disproportionate to the seriousness of the original crime,
would probably not invoke inforcement of the sentence.
A more difficult question is this: with what sovereign's criminal law must
the probationer comply? It is usually held that the subsequent enforcement of
a suspended sentence operates, not as a punishment for the misconduct constituting a breach of the condition of good behavior, but as a delayed punishment
for the original crime.13 Conceivably, therefore, the violation of the criminal
law of a foreign state, by an act occurring wholly in that state, might in a broad
sense, constitute a breach of the condition of good behavior. Obvious practical considerations, however, would probably prevent the enforcement of a suspended
sentence for foreign misconduct. An offense occurring within the borders of
the state in which the original sentence was suspended, may, on the other hand,
be a breach either of state or of federal law. Since, however, the delayed enforcement of the sentence is not a punishment for this offense, and since by the
Constitution of the United States the federal laws enacted in pursuance thereof
are made the supreme law of the land,14 equally obligatory with the state law
upon the inhabitants of each state, it would seem to be immaterial which of the
two bodies of law is violated. In either case there has been misbehavior in the
sense of violation of positive law. The question as to which court has jurisdiction to enforce the particular law has no relation to the problem whether there
has been such misconduct as to invoke enforcement of punishment for the
original crime.
In this connection, the recent North Carolina case of State v. Hardn,15 is of
particular interest. The facts in that case were these: Hardin was convicted
in Superior Court, in July, 1921, of assault with intent to kill. On motion,
prayer for judgment was continued, upon condition of payment of costs, of
payment of the private prosecutors' counsel fees, and upon the further condition
that "defendant appear at each criminal term of this court for two years and
show that he has been of good behavior and has not violated the law in any respect." At the November term of court, on motion of the solicitor, Hardin was
cited to show cause why sentence should not be imposed and enforced. The
trial judge found merely these facts: that Hardin had manufaotured and had
in his possession more than 150 gallons of wine, that he had bought grapes in
Bladen county, and that persons had been seen leaving his place in a drunken
condition. Thereupon, the order suspending sentence was set aside, and Hardin was
sentenced to serve twelve months on the roads. Upon appeal, the judgment
was reversed and remanded for a new trial to determine whether there had been
13State

v. Everitt, supra, note 4; Sylvester v. State, .rupra, note 6.
6, sec. 2.
15183 N. C. 815, 112 S. E. 593 (1922).

14 Art.
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a violation of the state law. The court held that the facts as found by the
judge below did not constitute such an offense, and that even if they did constitute a violation of the federal prohibition law, such an offense could not amount
to a violation of the condition in the suspension of sentence that Hardin maintain
good behavior and not violate the law in any respect. The court felt that since
the state court is without jurisdiction to inforce the federal laws on this subject,
the order of suspension could not have contemplated a violation of the federal
law as a breach of the condition. Chief justice Clark, however, in a vigorous
dissenting opinion, took the view suggested in this note.
It is respectfully submitted that the majority of the court did not give due
emphasis to the significance of the federal law as an integral part of the body
of law governing conduct in North Carolina, nor to the true function of the
enforcement of a suspended sentence as established by prior decisions in this
state. On both phases of the case, Chief Justice Clark seems to have taken the
better view.
J.P. T.

